




Carefully as the relations of the State and Federal Judiciary are
adjusted, an occasional collision between their respective procedures
cannot fail to occur. Our government, however perfect, has still,
like the most skillfully constructed machinery, its points7 of friction.
Fortunately, however, these conflicts of jurisdiction are of little
danger to the harmony of the system, for neither tribunal, however
vigorous in the maintenance of the rights of its suitors, has ever
shown itself jealous of the jurisdiction of the other, or eager to
establish an imaginary precedence of its own. Such a precedence,
indeed, had no foundation in theory or in fact. The Federal and
State Courts are but co-ordinate branches of the same general
judicature, different in sphere, but equal in origin and dignity.
And lawyers and laymen throughout the country, have ever had
the same home feeling towards both, and have regarded their
decisions and process with an equal respect and confidence. The
division of the judiciary has proved, in fact, only another source of
pride to us, by'showing that the Union is fertile enough in talent to
adorn the bench of both Courts with an unvarying series of Judges
of lofty integrity and profound learning.
21
CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION.
Yet this -very equality of dignity and right often renders it hard
to determine with exactness the occasions on which the process of
one is to yield before that of the other. The rule that in cases of
concurrent jurisdiction, that tribunal which first takes possession of
a cause must hold it exclusively, solves in practice many difficulties.
But there are often cases where, from the subject matter of the
suit, or !he effect of some constitutional provision, the Court whose
machinery has not been the first set in motion, is, nevertheless, the
more -appropriate forum. Thus it is held thaat proceedings under a
Bankrupt Law of the United States, are 'ecessarily exclusive of
similar proceedings in State Courts. So in a matter within the special
cognizance of one of these tribunals, the effect of a habea8 eorpu8
issued out of the other will be disregarded. Nor is this a charac-
teristic of our peculiar system alone.. The division of law and
equity in England and this country daily produces similar results.
The courts of common law still remain ignorant of equitable rights
ahd liens, and refuse to recognize their existence; while Chancery,
disregarding the procedure of the former, annuls its effect in favor
of trusts and equities of its own creation. Even the fact that the
remedies of the one are more convenient and complete, as under
the head of acco-unt, is sufficient. to deitroy the a4vantage of. an
accidental priority of time in -the other. However simple. and
easy of application, therefore, the general principle with regard to
concurrent jurisdictionA, may be, in order to bring any case within
its operation, it must, always be-first determined awhether these
jurisdictions are, in so far, identical in their nature, authority and
extent. This is often a matter of grave diffluty and doubt.
A very important question of this character has recently arisen
in Pennsylvania, uppn which Judges of the United States and
State Courts, have very materially differed in opinion...A vessel
whibh had been previously seized by a foreign attachment out of
the State Court, was libelled in .Admiralty in that. District for
wages. A petition for an interlocutory order of sale was presented,
which was- granted. Judge Kane sustained -the jurisdiction of
Admiralty on the ground that the lien for wages being a paramount
claim, was not affected by the proceedings in foreign. attachment,
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and therefore could be enforced at any time, whatever might be the
result of such proceedings. The same vessel.was also sold about
the same time under an interlocutory order in the attachment suit.
The Sheriff's vendee under this last sale thereupon brought an
action of replevin against the vendee of the Marshal for the recovery
of the'ship, which coming-to be tried, was determined in favor of
the former, under the charge of the 'Court, which elaborately and
ably sustained the origimal and exclusive jurisdiction of the Penn-
sylvania Court in the first instance. We have prepared for our
readers the reports of the opinions of both of the learned Judges in
this matter; that of Judge Kane, though not very recent in date,,
having never been published before. It may be remarked here,
that Judge Grier, of the Supreme Court of the United States, when
a subsequent branch of the same case was before him, held the
same doctrine as the District Judge.1
Without entering into any consideration of the weight of the
arguments on either side of this controversy, to which others are
far more competent, it will be sufficient atpresent to indicate briefly
the principal points on which the two Courts are at variance'. This
question is, in reality, as to the nature of maritime liens and the
extent to which they may be dealt with by a common' law Court.
For it is clear that proceedings in foreign attachment, for instance,
would have the effect of preventing the enforcement of such claims
only when the property in suit is turned into money. If bail were
given by the defendant or garnishee, and the vessel released, she
would still be liable to seamen and others as before. Now the
principle that a judicial sale divests liens and incumbrances, is
obviously applicable only to such of these as are capable of being
enforced against the fund so produced, and in the Court where the
sale takes place. Are what are called maritime liens of, that nature?
In Ehgland they are clearly not, because the common law knows of
no liens on personal property apart from possession, and it gives,
moreover, no means of enforcing-them judicially, if it did so recognize
their existence: Maritime liens are in fact only the creatures of
'Taylor vs. The Royil Saxon, 1 Wall. jr. 823.
